DEVELOPMENT OF THE USA RESPONSES TO NORTH KOREAN ATTEMPTS TO CONDUCT A HYBRID WAR IN 1966–1976

Authors

  • Denis A. Sadakov Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Vyatka State University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.33581/xvmcwj60

Keywords:

United States of America, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Korean demilitarised zone, 38th parallel

Abstract

The phenomenon of USA resistance to North Korean attempts to conduct a hybrid war is studied on the example of con- flicts in the Korean demilitarised zone and in the area of the Northern boundary line in 1966–1976. The confrontation between the USA and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea during this period was multi-dimensional and included such elements as Pyongyang’s propaganda campaigns, its support for left-wing radicals in Western countries and the recruitment of agents in the South. However, it was in the area of the 38th parallel that Democratic People’s Republic of Korea activity took on the cha- racter of a hybrid war, an important aspect of which was the actual or potential use of military force. The North’s actions pur- sued different objectives at different stages, but Pyongyang’s key objective remained to create conditions for the withdrawal of USA troops from Korea. In the later stages of the confrontation, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s forceful ac- tions were supplemented by persistent attempts to get direct USA – North Korean talks to reduce friction. This article exami- nes American perceptions of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea military activity during the period under study, identifies Washington’s approach to the responses the Americans used to counter North Korean actions, and presents the content and circumstances of key policy documents developed by Washington. The role of military force during the conflict is assessed. It concludes that deterrence of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was achieved through restraint and the use of ade- quate responses, which were designed to consider Pyongyang’s local military superiority in its chosen conflict zones.

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Published

2023-02-16

How to Cite

Sadakov, D. A. (2023). DEVELOPMENT OF THE USA RESPONSES TO NORTH KOREAN ATTEMPTS TO CONDUCT A HYBRID WAR IN 1966–1976. Zhurnal Belorusskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Istoriya, 5(1), 56-68. https://doi.org/10.33581/xvmcwj60

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